Introduction
When Charles J. Haughey became Taoiseach (prime minister) of Ireland for the fourth time in July 1989 he did so having abandoned his Fianna Fáil party's 'core value' that it would not enter into a coalition. He had called an early election because he calculated that he could achieve the overall majority that eluded him in the previous election in 1987. His minority government was popular and effective. Fianna Fáil, for the first time since the mid-1960s, was unified and ministers were happy. In the 1989 election the party lost seats and was now six short of what it needed to form a government, and it had lost the support of the opposition Fine Gael party which had indicated it would support the minority government if the government continued to introduce fiscally prudent policies. In forming a government with the Progressive Democrats (PDs) he coalesced with a party made up mainly of former Fianna Fáil TDs (MPs) who had formed the new party in 1984, having either left or been expelled from Fianna Fáil. The split was the culmination of a bitter split within Fianna Fáil that could be traced backed to 1970.
In the weeks after the election in June 1989, a clear majority of Haughey's cabinet opposed coalition, and many had, publicly come out against a coalition. A senior minister pointed out "The National Executive, the Parliamentary Party and the grass roots have indicated this is a core value which we must preserve". The party's National Executive had voted against it in early July. Haughey himself, perhaps as a negotiating ploy, had said he could 'never sell' coalition to his party (Whelan 2011: 233) .
Haughey soon realised he would have to agree to a coalition to avoid an immediate election, but his colleagues continued to object privately and publicly. Haughey privately agreed to open negotiations, causing more anger within his party when it was discovered. He then implicated his negotiators, both opponents of coalition, with delivering a deal that appeared to concede more to the junior party than most in Fianna Fáil would have wished.
While Haughey got his way, he did so at a cost. It cost him certain relationships with leading party figures. His inability to achieve an overall majority had also damaged him within the party. Within a few years Haughey was forced out of the leadership of the party he had led since 1979. Having conceded to the PDs on this occasion, he was forced to concede on further occasions in order to stay in office. And while Haughey performed well in the office of Taoiseach when it came to the world stage, he continued to make tactical errors. He won a leadership challenge in late 1991, but an issue that had emerged in 1982, and which he had survived then, came back to force his resignation even though no significant, new information emerged.
If leading is about letting people down gently, governing is often about managing retreat.
Rhetorical flourishes in campaigns often leave hostages to fortune on the electoral battlefield. This causes dangers for incoming government leaders as the trust or leadership capital invested in a leader is challenged or runs down. Haughey introduced some changes that might have been unthinkable for his party under any other leader. His followers had tended to trust Haughey. When he made the coalition deal, he allegedly stated that 'No one but I could have done it'. Had he used up too much capital? Had the trust in his judgment been damaged by the electoral failure and continual concessions? Or was this power politics, whereby his adversaries understood that his ability to control policy outcomes and deliver patronage was weakened and so his bargaining power within the party was weakened. It is likely of course that one fed into the other. But they are conceptually distinct. This relates to power, but it also relates to performance and how we evaluate performance.
It matters because we often think that who is leading matters (Hermann et al. 2001 ). With new leaders there is a possibility of shifting direction or restructuring policies. It is an important 'time' in leadership (Skowronek 2011) . If another leader were in place we could ask would there have been a different outcome? Whether they matter is central to how we evaluate leaders' performances. We seem to have a natural inclination to evaluate, and leadership evaluation has spawned a mini-industry. Rankings of leaders by experts were first done in the US by Arthur Schlesinger in 1948, but are now commonplace in media and academia (Ballard and Suedfeld 1988; Granatstein and Hilmer 1999; Johansson and Levine 2013; Schlesinger 1997; Strangio, 'T Hart, and Walter 2013; Schlesinger 1948; Theakson and Gill 2005) .
But in evaluating leadership performance we encounter major methodological difficulties.
First it is not clear what the dependent variable should be. Few agree on what the concept of leadership is or how to measure it. One way out of this impasse is to pass it on to others by using leadership evaluation. But this might be entirely subjective, which is acceptable if we have a sample of voters' opinions of the leader, but less so if it is a group of political scientists, historians or insiders whose opinions give the pretence of objectivity might feed off each other. An alternative (though related) dependent variable may be based somewhat on political power and the ability of a political leader to drive forward policy change. This has the advantage at least of being more objectively observable than evaluation of leader performance. Another obvious methodological difficulty then is that no two leaders face the same circumstances. It is affected by luck, where one political leader had relatively benign conditions or at least viable policy choices to make. Indeed even the same leaders face different circumstances in different policy domains. The sui generis nature of leaders means they often appear to defy generalisation or categorisation. This makes it difficult to make inferential conclusions on the causes of policy change or leadership support. Perhaps for this reason studies of leadership, though ubiquitous, have had surprisingly little impact in political science and political science has not had much impact on the study of leadership.
There is also an obvious endogeneity problem. Leaders are chosen for their times and their political environment, so we cannot evaluate them on their impact on their times and environment without complication -these are not independent. In evaluating the performance of former UK prime minister John Major we should remember that he was chosen precisely because the Conservative party wanted a policy moderate and more conciliatory leader.
This was in reaction to Margaret Thatcher who was seen as ideologically extreme and divisive, and who appeared to have lost her electoral touch.
Thatcher was in part chosen and able to achieve what she did because of the dire political and economic circumstances Britain faced in the late 1970s. She achieved power, and eventually support for what has been described as her 'revolution' after a 'Winter of Discontent' that followed a decade of disgruntlement (Jenkins 1987) . Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal is unlikely to have been acceptable had it not been for the Great Depression. As Storr points out, 'ideologists tend to get power…really in times of misery and frustration and hopeless-ness' (Tayar 1971: 100) . So can we say Thatcher had an impact because of her 'leadership' or was similar leadership inevitable given the circumstances? It's hard to tell. Of course this might be irrelevant. We may only be interested in whether a political figure has offered leadership or not, not explain why.
What is leadership?
Leadership is one of the messier concepts in social science. For that reason, though there has been much written on leadership, there is no agreed definition of leadership. Most generally we might think of leadership as the 'capacity to direct actions of others' (Ahlquist and Levi 2011: 3) . But even this seemingly broad ranging definition is not without problems, for surely leadership does not require 'action' (qua action) in others. While leaders in an organisation may want to change the behaviour of others, the leaders of a country may just want to change their attitudes. Many political leaders need only have the support of members of the public for their positions and themselves, especially if people change their positions, but also if people maintain support for a government's policy or the government.
Much of the literature takes as a given that certain people in positions of authority such as prime ministers are 'leaders', and then we can try to categorise the type of leader. The distinction is often between prime ministers who force change and those who manage: Chairman or Chief (Farrell 1971 ), Translational versus Transactional (Burns 1978 , Dominant, Operator or Consensus (Dowding and McLeay 2011) , or from 'suffixes' to 'weathermakers' (Hennessy 2000) . Many of these might be descended from the debate on Thomas Carlyle's theory that great men were responsible for the turns in history. Others of course argued that there was a certain historical inevitability to events CITES.
The truth of course is somewhere in the middle. Some leaders are highly skilled communicators able to exploit circumstances to further their own aims. But some, even highly skilled communicators such as Barack Obama, cannot further their policy goals because the circumstances are not conducive to major policy change. But we are given to think when evaluating leaders that they must make some difference. A key question in leadership studies must be what if someone else was in place, would there be a different outcome?
This implies that political leadership has something to do with policy. Here I assume political leadership relates to the ability to prescribe solutions to policy problems and get a significant number of followers to accept those solutions. The solutions do not have to be implemented for leadership to exist. One might be a leader of a proportion of the country, but never have the opportunity to take office yet her prescriptions are accepted by many. Or one may be someone who achieves office but fails to propose solutions to policy problems.
Those policy problems do not have to be extant in the minds of followers. A leader might raise people's awareness to the problems. So politicians who early on alerted people to the problem of climate change were not responding to a need among ordinary citizens for something to be done, they were alerting people to the problem. Then as Dewan and Myatt (2008) argue leadership is principally about solving a co-ordination problem among people or a group. Leaders provide information and their 'leadership' depends on the clarity of their communication and the need for leadership. Then the extent of the co-ordination problem is not so much a problem for the leader as a source of power. Edwards (2009) , writing on the US presidency would argue that though leaders do matter, their freedom to cause changes is circumscribed by circumstance. He shows cases where the 'weathermaking' presidents who appear to garner major political victories did not achieve these as a result of persuasion or changing the opinion of the public. Rather, he argues, the presidents are facilitators who use opportunities to transform policy as far as they can given the circumstances. Thus we see that major change is often preceded by crisis. For this reason we should see crises as opportunities for leadership. Skilled leaders will exploit the crisis to move policy closer to their ideal points. Less skilled leaders will not. Edwards didn't offer a theory as to how this happened, rather he showed cases of where it worked.
Political leadership then has something to do with political power but is distinct from power.
Having the power to do something or the power to make someone do something is not leadership. Leadership requires a change in opinion or behaviour in followers which is voluntary. One might achieve that power through leadership. If we see shifts in policy direction or a country changing tack, and doing so willingly we can think of this as a result of leader-ship. Then one way of measuring the existence of leadership in politics is whether support for a position taken by a leader increases or if a party or its leader's poll ratings are high.
How nominal leaders achieve real policy change should also be a key question in leadership studies. I would suggest we should look at how leaders can structure the choices of others (O'Malley 2007) . A key factor is whether the political leader has ambitions to change policy. In Skowronek's (2011) words, we might ask whether the leader is affiliated or opposed to the status quo. One might first look at the popularity of the status quo policy compared to any rivals, or as Skowronek would put it, whether it is vulnerable or resilient. Public opinion might be against a proposed policy, or the status quo might be reasonably popular making changes more difficult to achieve. The formal powers to achieve change are also important.
Unlike US presidents who have strong foreign policy powers (though are weak domestically), prime ministers have few formal prerogatives that allow them to implement a policy.
They have limited 'power to' implement policy. However many prime ministers have significant 'power over' those people or institutions that can introduce, approve and implement a policy. Therefore we need to look at the powers political leaders have over those actors that can change policy.
With this in mind we might see a number of different approaches to leadership. These probably should not be thought of as competing theories rather as independent variables which might complement one another additively or interactively. One approach is trait theory or that leaders' personalities matter. The traits might include articulacy, organisational capacity, political skill, vision, and cognitive and emotional intelligence (Greenstein 2009 ). If persuasion is important to political leadership (Neustadt 1960 ) then we can see how political issues are framed will be important. In crises we can see this is important as leaders try to explain the crisis in some way, assigning responsibility and promoting a policy solution.
Situational theories are also important, whereby leaders emerge to respond to historical opportunities. In less exaggerated terms we see that situations provide political opportunities which can be exploited to a leader's ends if they can behave strategically (Edwards 2009 ). Other important factors are the institutional architecture and political support. These can determine the strategic choices open to potential leaders.
Outline and argument
We can see from the literature that policy is centrally important to political leadership. Moving public opinion by offering and achieving policy solutions to policy problems is probably one of the more important factors to affect evaluations of a leader. When a leader has a 'vision', conveys that to the public and is able to deliver on his or her promise, we can expect that the leader will be positively evaluated. In their proof of concept paper Bennister, 't Hart, and Worthy argue that the concept of Leadership Capital might be useful to study policy all leaders. Leadership Capital, they argue is 'aggregate authority composed of three dimensions: skills, relations, and reputation. Leadership Capital can explain the level of authority a political leader achieves. They go on to propose an operationalisation of Leadership Capital, through an index.
In this paper I will apply the Leadership Capital Index to Ireland, and in doing so offer both a critique of the idea of Leadership Capital and its operationalisation. The critique centres on questions whether Leadership Capital can be distinguished from other factors that influence the performance of political leaders. I also ask whether LCI really offers anything new.
Issues with Leadership Capital
Trust is a central concept in politics, but one that is rarely dealt with. For Confucius three things are needed to govern: weapons, food and trust. He argued that if a leader is forced to choose to give one up, he should give weapons (or security) first, then food (welfare). Without trust he argued, the leader cannot survive (O'Neill 2002: 3) . This makes sense experientially. Political leaders in war such as Churchill had lost the security battle in that the UK was being directly hit. Welfare was under attack, as food shortages and rationing demonstrated.
But there was a degree of trust in Churchill and the state to deal with it, even when success was far from assured.
For the idea of Leadership Capital to work must be based on levels of trust in a leader. While institutional factors facilitate the ability to achieve policy and other goals, conceptually these should be disentangled from Capital as trust. Institutions are shown to be very important as to whether a prime minister succeeds or not in achieving his or her goals. The institution-al structure at times gives direct policy setting power to leaders, for instance the power of presidential orders. These allow the leader to directly effect policy outcomes considering only the likelihood of the policy's success and whether it will be popular with a country's voters or population. This still leaves important challenges and the ability to sell a policy to the public and manage implementation of a policy still leaves quite a bit for the leader to do.
But usually a leader must also work with other actors and secure their agreement even before one can start to think about implementation (of course strategic leaders will think about this long before formal political agreement is achieved). It is noteworthy, though rarely noted, that in parliamentary democracies prime ministers have very few direct policy making powers. For them to achieve policy goals they need to work with other actors. They do this by structuring the choices faced by those actors. And in this we can see that prime ministers are often well endowed. They are given certain political resources, such as patronage which enables the leader to structure the choices the other actors involved in policy decisions make.
We can see that the office sometimes makes the man or woman. There are instances of a reasonably weak leader in opposition becomes transformed by office. Tis may happen for a number of reasons. The roles are quite different, like the difference between defence and attack in sport. In opposition one might have to be aggressive and focussed on detail, whereas in government one is often expected to be a unifier. One will also have much more support which relieves one of some of the pressure. Another reason relates to the power office often confers. While political leaders are at all times both principals and agents, in opposition the leader is doing a service to the pay to get it into power.
But it is not a sufficient condition, and is not even a necessary condition. Recent research on Russia by Baturo and Elkink (forthcoming) shows convincingly that a significant proportion of power is based in the individual. For instance Vladimir Putin's alternation between president and prime minister of Russia showed little change in his political or leadership capital.
Russia is possibly an unusual case. And in many western countries the office provides more resources than the skillful individual can accumulate without office. However it is clear that even those institutional resources interact with the personal skills of the individuals.
How do we conceptualise Capital? The word capital is used in a number of forms, most famously in political science as social capital, where it is the glue that holds society together. It is a resource but not one that is spent in the way money in a wallet might be spent. Using social capital can reinforce or strengthen the glue. So it is not a fixed resource to be used.
Like financial capital it can be invested and wisely invested yields more. If it is not used it is diminished. It cannot be hoarded. Like economic capital it might be diminished by the political equivalent of inflation -events. Events will inevitably come along challenging the political leader, and can eat into political capital. Leadership capital is something that can evaporate easily in a crisis, like the way a financial crisis can eliminate economic resources.
So Leadership Capital is a resource that must be used, can be reinvested and can grow or diminish quickly. It is not clear either, that Leadership Capital is something that requires a transaction. For a leader to draw on the trust of followers or colleagues does not require them to give something in return, at least not directly. The trust is probably lent to them by cabinet and parliamentary or party colleagues in terms of electoral support. The trust that ordinary citizens lend might be in the expectation (based on past delivery or simple goodwill) of policy success. As such Leadership Capital is not a zero sum resource (though it may be transferred to another leader in the case that a leader fails to satisfy the expectation. It is also possible when there are no alternative leaders in which people are willing to invest trust then we see a threat to the regime). As such the Leader is not necessarily giving anything up, but any action may prove costly if the leader is thought to have made a mistake.
A question we might ask of Leadership Capital is what it explains. Does it explain a freedom to act or bring followers along that is separate from transactional leadership where a follower will accept a leader's actions not in trust that it will turn out alright, but because there's a specific return on offer. An example of the former might be where a follower accepts a policy change that one might not approve on the basis that the leader's track record is one that shows it might work. This differs from a transactional exchange in which one accepts this sub-optimal policy on the basis that there is a direct return, such as an appoint-ment. This distinction is not as clear as it might sound. MPs may accept a policy from one leader they wouldn't normally support because they believe it will be popular or that the leader will make it work. In the opening vignette we could ask if support for Haughey was based on trust resulting from past performance, or because Haughey had a superior bargaining position, in that he controlled the political cares of his party colleagues.
The trust that followers and colleagues invest in a lead is probably on the basis of a number of factors, many explicitly captured by Bennister et al.'s Leadership Capital Index. These will be factors such as political and communication skills, their electoral record and current polling. Where a leader has previously shown competence, followers will feel less suspicious and less need to monitor or act as a check on the leader. But other factors mentioned in Bennister et al. seem either irrelevant or the instrument used to capture are so soft and close to the underlying concept we may as well ask experts to measure Leadership Capital directly.
Another problem is raised if we wish to use the LCI to do more than just describe leaders' capital. What if we are going to use Leadership Capital to explain something, such as their performance? It would be very difficult to use LCI to explain the performance of leaders given that much of what makes up LCI relates to their performance. Then we might ask whether it is a measure of performance, in which case why not say that explicitly.
Issue not dealt with is the extent of trust. Trust might be deeply held or could be displaced easily. But we also need to consider who holds the trust in the leader. One might be trusted within the party, parliament, government and the public. While the trust in these might be correlated they don't correlate perfectly. Indeed we often see someone might be a 'party man', who is respected in the party and may have high Capital in that forum, but be regarded with suspicion elsewhere. These distinctions are important because they affect how we can use LCI. If it's used as a variable to explain policy making power, where a leader is well regarded might also impact how leaders behave. So they might foster capital in one forum because it is seen as important to achieve ones goals.
And aspects of the LCI are possibly non falsifiable. So if once acquired, 'capital becomes part of a reputational cycle' how do we test whether capital was an important factor influencing the performance of a leader? If they perform poorly, we can say that their reputation suffered and they had low Leadership Capital. What we might want to see is if the leader had strong Leadership Capital in advance of a specific challenge, such as a crisis or an attempted major policy shift.
I will now go through the items that make up the index and question whether they are valid, reliable and useful measures of what a LCI should try to capture.
S1-1 Political/ Policy vision
Whether a leader has a vision or not will be important for how we evaluate the leader, but it is surely a necessary condition for leadership? It is not clear that it is linked to Capital in any way. What we are interested in is whether it is delivered or not.
S1-2 Communicative performance
This relates to the ability to sell a vision and convince followers. And while it may be an important factor used to build up Capital, it is distinct from Capital itself. One can easily recognise Barack Obama's strong communications skills, but acknowledge that his Capital has waned.
S2-3 Personal poll rating compared to last election
Leadership Capital is the trust certain people invest in a leader. For the trust the general populations holds this will be reflected in poll ratings. These will be correlates. But it is difficult to see how the direction of causality, if there, will not run in the direction of trust to poll rating.
S2-4 Longevity in office
Leadership Capital might explain or correlate with how long someone can stay in office, but not the other way around. Longevity has no conceptual connection with LC.
S2 -5 leadership election margin
This reflects the popularity of the leader within his or her own party. It might however be entirely a function of the alternative candidates. Making this a hard score risks going an invalid sense of the trust invested in the leader. Also politicians are forward looking, so what they thought of the leader when choosing him or her will not causally affect (but may correlate with) what they think of the leader now.
R1-6 Polling of the party relative to election results
Whether a leader is delivering a likelihood of reelection for MPs is going to be important for the latitude they will support a leader. If a party is in government it will usually be negative, especially if taken at midterm. Politicians know this and are usually quite good at seeing whether the poll rating is just a reflection of mid-term blues or a more fundamental disenchantment with the government/ political leader.
R1-7 Level of public trust in the leader

In many ways this is Leadership Capital. Trust in the leader (from the public or colleagues) is
what gives them the freedom to act at times against what followers would allow from another leader they didn't have trust in.
R1-8 Likelihood of a credible leadership challenge
This is obviously only relevant in parliamentary systems, which might be a problem. But this is in some ways a measure of trust in the leader from within the party, and so is crucial. We might ask however if this is one of what Leadership Capital is trying to explain. This is also a very soft measure, and is as such quite unreliable, and will be affected whether a leadership challenge actually happened.
R2-9 Perceived ability to shape the party's policy platform
Perceptions of the ability to shape policy are presumably highly correlated with whether one has a policy vision (S1-1). Perceptions will by their nature be unreliable. Again it is possible something we might be trying to use LCI to explain -whether a leader could effect policy change.
R2-10 Perceived parliamentary effectiveness
This might be seen as important in the UK House of Commons, where PMQs are a type of weekly test for the leaders. In other countries parliamentary performance tends to be bland and everyone knows and accepts that. There is also an issue in the direction of causality. If the party's caucus supports and trust the leader, i.e LC is high, then the leader may be more confident and perform well.
Cases: Ireland's crisis Taoisigh
I'll now apply the LCI to Ireland during the crisis. A crisis sets challenges to leaders to do something and so make good cases for leadership studies. Crises can make or break a politi- Case studies often come in for criticism as being unscientific, because of the small number of units on which to make a finding and the ability to subjectively interpret data. Cases are often unique and tests are not easily replicable. The issue of verification by repetition does not arise because of the unique nature of each case. But that does not make scientific inquiry impossible -in fact it is a very narrow definition of science that insists we must find support for theories only by prediction against new data. We can use new data, but it will not hold constant other factors. In these new data we need to look for patterns that correspond to a more general body of scientific knowledge (Glad 2002: 18-19) . 
The office of Taoiseach
Irish politics is usually regarded as anomalous. While this makes it hard to make generalisation from, anomalies are useful for generating hypotheses (Freedman 2008) . Ireland is anomalous in a number of areas. The party system pits two large ideologically indistinct parties against each other and there is no obvious social basis for the two parties' support (Byrne and O'Malley 2012). Another area Ireland appears to be different is that the legislature is exceptionally weak compared to the executive. The whip system is abnormally strong and sanctions imposed for voting against one's party seems to many, extraordinarily severe.
Within the executive the office of Taoiseach is regarded as one which holds a great deal of power within its own system (O'Malley and Martin 2010). The tendency is to categorise Taoisigh as being either Chairmen or Chiefs (Chief being the literal translation of Taoiseach), where a chairman is used when the government is a coalition. In fact it might be better to ask how the holders of the office are temperamentally. Some, such as Jack Lynch, had large single party majority governments, but were inclined caution. Others such as Charles J.
Haughey and Garret FitzGerald, led either divided parties or coalition governments, but were instinctively chiefs who liked to be involved in every decision and had an opinion on everything.
Institutionally the office has accreted a good deal of power since Haughey and FitzGerald took office from 1979. The number of staff has grown, and cross-cutting policy areas are now co-ordinated from there. The use of cabinet committees has grown, all giving the Taoiseach a greater role in policy making.
The last two holders of the office compared
The last two men to achieve the office of Taoiseach, Brian Cowen and Enda Kenny, had some parallels but in many ways were also quite different. Both were the sons of TDs (MPs) who when their fathers died in office were elected to Dáil Éireann in by-elections (the Irish 
Indicators
Brian Cowen's experience score
Vision
Cowen was never a policy-focused politician. As Foreign Affairs minister he did show some initiative, and shifted policy on some issues. Generally he was a safe pair of hands This was because he was leader of the largest party. However there was still a great deal of skepticism in his ability to succeed in the task -he had been subject to a leadership challenge eight months earlier. It was probably this that helped him establish himself as a serious politician. Ten years earlier had you predicted that he would be Taoiseach 
Indicators Enda Kenny's experience score
Vision Like Cowen lacked an overarching policy vision. Probably a conservative but regarded as an 'unlikely leader' with no ideology (Rafter 2011: 24, 26 
Conclusions and discussion
What is notable about the cases above is that LC as measured here would not have been useful to predict who was likely to be the more successful Taoiseach. Kenny was possibly luck to come to power when the country's position was so abysmal. He provided an illusion of change as much as anything. But he was also able to set a positive tone and his energy
was useful in what became a cheerleader role. His success was undoubtedly to do with some personal resources, but also a lot had to do with the fact that he now controlled the political careers of many senior politicians and he controlled the Irish policy making system.
By contrast Cowen revealed he lacked control of events, and his high levels of leadership capital dissipated.
In this paper I accept that Leadership Capital is a product of reputation, skills and relations, but I wonder to what extent it can be usefully used. Cowen's reputation was damaged by the emergence of the crisis and how he handled it. But what does using Leadership Capital tell us? That his reputation was damaged and his capital fell? In trying to explain everything of 'leadership' it risks explaining nothing.
